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THE FRACTURED UNITY OF ANTITRUST LAW AND THE
ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE STEVENS
Alvin K. Klevorick*
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice John Paul Stevens has had a major impact on the development of
antitrust law since his elevation to the Supreme Court in 1975. He has
written opinions in more than 30 antitrust cases that have come before the
Court, and this count does not include a number of cases principally
concerned with more general issues of procedure that arose in an antitrust
context. Justice Stevens has written for the Court in major cases covering a
broad range of antitrust issues. These include cases involving horizontal
restraints among competitors,1 tying,2 monopolization,3 and mergers.4 He
has also written frequently to explain not only his dissent from the Court's
decision but, on numerous occasions, his reasons for concurring with the
majority's decision but departing from its reasoning.
Reading the compendium of Justice Stevens's antitrust opinions
suggests several reasons for his proclivity to write separately in so many
antitrust cases. The first is his general conception of the judicial role, the
importance to him of explaining as fully and clearly as possible the reasons
for his reaching a particular decision. The deliberative process-whether in
the legislature, the executive, or the courts-emerges as central to Justice
Stevens's model of government. In his view, the judge's role within this
model is to be clear to the court's various audiences about the reasons for the
decisions that are made. Hence, one finds that even when he is joining a
• John Thomas Smith Professor of Law, Yale University. I would like to thank
Michael Graetz, Lawrence Lessig, and Alan Schwartz for helpful discussions and for their
comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am also extremely grateful to Jeffrey C.
Cohen and Charles C. Correll, Jr. for their valuable research assistance. These people, of
course, bear no responsibility for any faults that may remain.
1. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n., 493 U.S. 411
(1990); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S.
85 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
2. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-15 (1984); United
States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
3. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
4. California v. American Stores, 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
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dissent, Justice Stevens may write separately, however briefly, to explain the
nuance of difference between him and the other dissenters.5
The second principal reason for the scope and depth of Justice Stevens's
antitrust opinions is his deep affection and concern for antitrust law and
policy, which is manifested in his opinions. He is devoted to this area of the
law, an area in which he practiced, taught, and served in govemment.6 It
seems, from his opinions, that it is particularly important to him that this
body of law be faithfully and soundly developed. Hence, Justice Stevens
takes great pains to see that the analyses of the antitrust cases that come
before the Court are as complete and as careful as possible.
It is for these reasons, perhaps, that Justice Stevens's antitrust
jurisprudence is so enlightening. Not only have his opinions for the Court
shaped antitrust law in a major way over the past twenty years, but the set of
all his antitrust opinions-concurrences and dissents, as well as opinions for
the Court-taken together provides a fairly complete picture of one major
player's conception of this body of law. The themes and the tensions
reflected in Justice Stevens's opinions mirror those in the body of antitrust
law today. And because he writes with great clarity, the image in that mirror
is sharply defined.
The image of antitrust law that emerges from Justice Stevens's opinions
has, I shall argue, several prominent features. First, he is searching for a
coherence and unity in antitrust law. But this search is sharply constrained
by his deep respect for both the will of the legislature, as revealed by the
legislative history of the antitrust statutes, and judicial precedent. Taken
together these legislative and judicial expressions make it difficult to adhere
to the view that the goal of antitrust law is single-minded. And, the role that
earlier opinions accord per se analysis makes it difficult to argue that there
is a unitary approach to deciding antitrust cases. Second, Justice Stevens's
strong support of the broad purposes of antitrust law leads him to stretch the
5. See, e.g., Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Lab., 460 U.S. 150,
171 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6. Justice Stevens served from 1951 to 1952 as Associate Counsel to the
Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power, Committee on the Judiciary, United States
House of Representatives; and from 1953 to 1955 as Member of the Attorney General's
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. He was Lecturer in Antitrust Law at
Northwestern University School of Law from 1950 to 1954, and at the University of
Chicago Law School from 1955 to 1958. From 1950 until his appointment as a federal
judge in 1970, he was a private practitioner with a specialization in antitrust. See Richard
Y. Funston, Stevens, John Paul, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO TIlE SUPREME COURT OF TIlE
UNITED STATES 836 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992); Tribute, John Paul Stevens, 1992-1993
ANNuAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAw.
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reach of the statutes as far as possible. For example, he casts a skeptical eye
on exemptions from the antitrust laws, and he insists that particular
organizational relations between potential defendants not lead their joint
activities to evade the grasp of those laws. But, although the Justice would
have antitrust policy sweep broadly vis-a-vis potential defendants' activities,
his notions of causal linkages often lead him to limit the set of plaintiffs who
can attack those activities. Third, Justice Stevens recognizes the central role
of the facts in each antitrust case, and he is extremely respectful of the job
done by the trier of fact in the court of original jurisdiction. But sometimes
he finds a deeper or richer understanding of these facts than did the court
below-or than his colleagues do-and sometimes, for all his attention to
the facts, he does not provide an interpretation that is clearly more
illuminating than competing alternatives.
n. A COMMON LAW APPROACH AND THE SEARCH FOR COHERENCE
A. The Common Law of Unreasonable Restraints of Trade
Justice Stevens's approach to antitrust law is that of a common law
judge. Courts have a major role to play in this area of law because, although
it is statutorily based, the principal statute, the Sherman Act, is extremely
vague.? The legislative statement is a skeleton that leaves a broad range for
courts to fill in, a task they have indeed pursued over time. Justice Stevens
takes the role of the judiciary in this area to be the careful elaboration of the
vague commands of the Sherman Act, an elaboration that is to come from a
case-by-case development that is highly attentive to the facts of the
particular cases.8
7. When Justice Stevens considers application of the Robinson-Patman Act, another
antitrust statute that is less vague than the Shennan Act, he focuses more intently on
statutory language and on the statute's express recognition of only certain limited
affIrmative defenses. See Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 554-57 (1990).
8. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 603 (1976) ("[T]he Court should
adhere to its settled policy of giving concrete meaning to the general language of the
Shennan Act by a process of case-by-case adjudication of specific controversies."). Among
the sources upon which Justice Stevens has drawn for the fIlling-in of the gaps in the
Shennan Act are common-law precedents that precede the Act itself. See City of Columbia
v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 386 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing The Case of Monopolies, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (Q.B. 16(2»; cf. Business Elec. Corp.
v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 736-37 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Congress
plainly intended the Act to be interpreted in the light of its common-law
background ...."); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 785
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While Justice Stevens takes this common law approach to antitrust, he
strives for coherence and unity in this body of law. He repeatedly identifies
the goal of the antitrust laws as the preservation of competition in the
ultimate service of enhancing consumer welfare.9 There are times, however,
at which this singlemindedness fades to the background and indeed a
possibly inconsistent goal-protecting competitorslO-comes to the fore. l1
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Since the statute was written against the background of
the common law, reference to the common law is particularly enlightening in construing the
statutory requirement of a 'contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy' ."); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 531 (1983) ("Congress intended the [Sherman] Act to be
construed in the light of its common-law background."); National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) ("The legislative history makes it
perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad
mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.").
9. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
(1985) (considering "impact on consumers"); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 584 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing to extraction of monopoly profits "at the expense of the
consuming public" as "central concern of both the development of the common law of
restraint of trade and our antitrust jurisprudence"); Hoover, 466 U.S. at 600 (referring to
imposition of "the very costs on the consuming public which the antitrust laws were
designed to avoid"); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Okla.,468 U.S. 85,102 (1984) (defendant's actions "widen consumer choice ... and hence
can be viewed as procompetitive"); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107 (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.s. 330, 343 (1979) ("Congress designed the Sherman Act as a consumer
welfare prescription." (internal quotation marks omitted»); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110 (noting
"Sherman Act's command that price and supply be responsive to consumer preference");
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984) (noting that "the statute
was especially intended to serve" the interests of the consumer); Associated Gen.
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 530
(1983) ("The legislative history of [Section 7 of the Sherman Act] shows that Congress waS
primarily interested in creating an effective remedy for consumers who were forced to pay
excessive prices ...."); Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 538 ("[T]he Sherman Act
was enacted to assure customers the benefits of price competition ...."); National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) ("The Sherman Act reflects a legislative
judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better
goods and services.").
10. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 353 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that in at least some situations, "the antitrust laws protect
competitors precisely for the purpose of protecting competition"); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort
of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 125 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting congressional
purpose, in enacting 1950 amendment to Section 7 of Clayton Act, of protecting small
businesses); Cargill, 479 U.S. at 128-29 (inferring reasonable probability that a competitor
will be harmed from reasonable probability that competition will be harmed).
11. Cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.s. 294, 320 (1962) (stating that the
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Indeed, in at least one instance, Justice Stevens explicitly rejects the
proposition that economic efficiency and consumer welfare are the sole
objective of the antitrust laws. 12 The Justice does not provide much of a
reconciliation of the several goals he identifies, which the case law,
following the language of Brown Shoe, customarily characterizes as
opposing objectives.
There is the further problem, in striving for coherence, that Justice
Stevens, and the entire Court for that matter, has not been clear exactly what
he means by competition. At some points, what is to be preserved by
antitrust law is a particular process. At others, a set of outcomes-the ones
that a perfectly competitive market would produce-constitutes the target at
which the antitrust laws aim.
B. Horizontal and Vertical Restraints
Justice Stevens's search for coherence in the antitrust laws and his
expression of the unity he finds have several different dimensions. First, he
believes that the best way to understand section 1 of the Sherman Act is as
an attack on the restraints of trade that Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft
described as "naked restraints" of trade in his Addyston Pipe opinion13
nearly a century ago. Although Justice Stevens generally respects and defers
to the precedents that distinguish vertical restraints of trade from horizontal
ones and that prescribe different treatment for the two types of agreements,
he believes there is a unity to section 1 of the Sherman Act. For him, this
finds expression in Judge Taft's distinction between naked restraints of trade
and ancillary restraints of trade.14
antitrust laws were enacted for "the protection of competition, not competitors").
12. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 360 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("The Court, in its haste to excuse illegal behavior in the name of efficiency,
has cast aside a century of understanding that our antitrust laws are designed to safeguard
more than efficiency and consumer welfare...." (footnotes omitted)).
13. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899).
14. [d. at 282-83 ("[N]o conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the
covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and
necessary to protect the covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract,
or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party....
But where the sole object of both parties in making the contract as expressed therein is
merely to restrain competition, and enhance or maintain prices, it would seem that there
was nothing to justify or excuse the restraint, that it would necessarily have a tendency to
monopoly, and therefore would be void.")
HeinOnline -- 27 Rutgers L.J. 642 1995-1996
642 RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:3
Justice Stevens's characterization of the core meaning of section 1 leads
him to conceptualize some cases in a different way than do his colleagues on
the Court. A principal example is the Business Electronics case.15 Here
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that a manufacturer's termination of a
price-cutting dealer as a result of complaints by a competing dealer is not a
per se violation of section I unless the manufacturer and the complaining
dealer, who survives in the market, agree on a price to be charged. Justice
Stevens, emphasizing the unity of section 1, essentially collapsed the
categories of horizontal and vertical restraints16 and focused on the effects
that the agreement between the manufacturer and the complaining dealer had
on the market in which the dealers sold. Since Justice Stevens had no doubt
that the agreement resulted in elimination of some competition, the only
question remaining for him was whether the agreement was ancillary to
some other agreement or was a naked restraint.17 Since "the contractual
relationship between [the manufacturer] and [the complaining dealer] was
exactly the same after [the price-cutting dealer's] termination as it had been
before that termination,"18 the result of the agreement was a per se illegal
"naked restraint" of trade in the dealer market, which constituted a violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Similarly, in the ARCO case,19 Justice Stevens was less taken than were
his colleagues in the Court majority by the fact that the maximum price to be
charged at the retail level was set by the oil company manufacturer rather
than by the dealers themselves. He saw little difference in the effect on the
retail gasoline market between such a constraint being imposed by
participants in that market themselves and the same price being set by the
manufacturer.20 Whether imposed horizontally or vertically, a naked
15. Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
16. Jd. at 736 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he restraint that results when one or more
dealers threaten to boycott a manufacturer unless it terminates its relationship with a price-
cutting retailer is more properly viewed as a 'horizontal restraint."').
17. Jd. (dismissing distinction between horizontal and vertical restraints as "quite
irrelevant to the outcome of this case," and arguing that distinction between naked restraints
and ancillary restraints is "of much greater importance"); id. at 744-45.
18. Jd. at 740-41.
19. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990) (Stevens. J.,
dissenting).
20. Jd. at 355 ("This focus on the vertical character of the agreement is misleading
because it incorrectly assumes that there is a sharp distinction between vertical and
horizontal arrangements, and because it assumes that all vertical arrangements affect
competition in the same way.").
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restraint of trade-of the classic price-fixing type-had been effected, and it
was per se illegal.
C. The Rule ofReason and Per Se Rules
A second manifestation of Justice Stevens's quest for unity is his
conviction that in antitrust law generally, and particularly in the law
concerning horizontal restraints of trade, there is only one inquiry, and that
is the application of the rule of reason.21 This analysis has two
complementary branches, he tells us in his important opinion for the Court
in Professional Engineers,22 but they are simply two different strands of the
same approach.23 The per se approach applies when the nature and character
of the restraint itself makes detailed analysis unnecessary, while the more
detailed rule-of-reason inquiry is applied when that clarity is absent. As
courts become more familiar with the effects of particular practices in the
marketplace, the set of restraints to which a per se rule applies develops over
time in a characteristically common-law fashion.24 The picture of how the
set of offenses in the per se circle in a Venn diagram grows over time is
much the same as the picture that Justice Holmes presented in his lectures
about the evolution of the common law and the allocation of tasks between
judge and jury.25 The articulation of per se rules is an act of judicial
21. Cf. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("[T]he
legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether
it restrains competition .... The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as
may suppress or even destroy competition."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
62 (1911) ("[T]he criteria [sic] to be resorted to in any given case for the purpose of
ascertaining whether violations of the section have been committed, is the rule of
reason ....").
22. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691-92
(1978).
23. See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 476 (1978)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[P]roperly understood, rule-of-
reason analysis is not distingt from 'per se' analysis. On the contrary, agreements that are
illegal per se are merely' a species within the broad category of agreements that
unreasonably restrain trade ... .").
24. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) ("Once
experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence
that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the
restraint is unreasonable.").
25. OUYER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw, reprinted in 3 THE COllECTED
WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 109, 170-80 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., 1995) (1881) (explaining
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economy, as each rule succinctly states the established law as it applies to
particular behavior.
Not only are the application of the per se rule and the undertaking of a
full-scale rule-of-reason analysis simply two facets of a unitary approach,
but Justice Stevens also stresses that it is often difficult to tell from the
questions asked and the scope of the inquiry a court undertakes which one of
the two approaches is being followed. Sometimes as much analysis of the
market and the behavior of its participants is required to apply the per se rule
as is needed to reach an assessment under the rule of reason.26 It is
particularly difficult to discern from the substance of a Stevens opinion, and
not just from the labels its author invokes, whether a rule-of-reason analysis
has been used or a per se rule applied. His attention to the facts of each case
is so meticulous and his compulsion to explain his decision is so strong that
he invariably provides a full analysis of the market, the behavior of the
participants, and the character of the restraint, even when he describes
himself as applying a per se rule.
For example, in Maricopa27 Justice Stevens tells us that the agreement
among the doctors in the medical society to fix the maximum fees they will
charge is a per se violation of section 1.28 Putting aside whether or not one
believes that his ultimate balancing decision was correct, it is difficult to see
how the breadth of the consideration of the putative pro-competitive aspects
of the agreement at issue in Maricopa would have been much greater under a
rule-of-reason analysis. On the other hand, it is also true that in NCAA,
where Justice Stevens uses a rule-of-reason approach, the analysis of the pro-
competitive justifications for the restrictions in the television allocation rules
under attack is fairly foreshortened.29
Despite Justice Stevens's repeated proclamation of the unity of antitrust
treatment of horizontal restraints of trade under section 1, he believes that
once a restraint has come to be characterized as a per se violation of the
antitrust laws, that sharp characterization must be maintained. The per se
treatment of these offenses-for example, minimum or maximum price
fixing, boycotts, and tying-then becomes an integral part of his analysis of
antitrust cases. This approach reflects Justice Stevens's deep deference to
"process of specification" of negligent actions).
26. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26
(1984) ("Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the
evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct.")
27. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
28. [d. at 356-57.
29. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
HeinOnline -- 27 Rutgers L.J. 645 1995-1996
1996] FRACTURED UNITY OF ANTITRUST LAW 645
precedent, but it also constrains the analysis that he will undertake and the
conclusions that he will allow himself to reach.
Consider, for example, Jefferson Parish v. Hyde,30 in which Justice
Stevens takes a major step forward in tying cases by making a showing of
market power in the tying product an essential requirement of a plaintiff's
action. But at least in part because of his perception of the strength of
precedent31 he makes this move within the context of tying being a per se
offense. His approach calls for more sophisticated analysis of tying cases
than an unqualified per se rule would permit, but he is unprepared to move
. all the way to the seemingly logical conclusion of a call for a rule-of-reason
analysis in all tying cases. It is precisely such a step that Justice O'Connor
takes in her concurrence,32 for which she usually receives plaudits from
antitrust scholars.33
Another instance in which Justice Stevens's analysis is constrained by
his deference to the per se rule occurs in his dissent in ARCO.34 In this case,
the majority takes the position that a gasoline retailer can suffer antitrust
injury, and hence acquire standing to recover damages, as the result of an oil
company's promulgation of a maximum resale price for the retailer's
competitors, only if the oil company sets a predatory price. While the
majority remands the case for a determination of whether the price was set at
a predatory level, Justice Stevens dissents. He would infer antitrust injury to
the retailer directly from the per se character of the offense of vertical
maximum resale price fixing. Because of the per se illegality of vertical
resale price maintenance, Justice Stevens does not undertake a detailed
inquiry into the implications of the arrangement and the effects it might have
on the plaintiff retailer.
The ARCO majority makes the cogent case that unless the maximum
price is set at a predatory level, it is hard to see how the retailer can be
harmed as a result of his competitors' being barred from raising their prices
above a particular level. Although Justice Stevens is usually careful about
inquiring into the motivations for market participants' behavior35 and the
30. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
31. [d. at 9 ("It is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question
the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling
competition and therefore are unreasonable 'per se' .").
32. [d. at 33 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
33. See, e.g., HERBERT HoVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POUCY § lOA, at 362-66
(1994) (arguing against per se treatment of tying arrangements).
34. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
35. [d. at 358 ("In a conspiracy case we should always ask why the defendants have
elected to act in concert rather than independently.").
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effects of that behavior, he departs from his practice by not asking those
questions here; these questions are precisely the ones the majority does ask.
The reason, I suggest, is that the per se illegality of the behavior at issue
forecloses such ;m inquiry for Justice Stevens.
The most dramatic illustration of the value that Justice Stevens attaches
to per se rules is the opinion he wrote for the Court in Superior Court Trial
Lawyers.36 Writing for six Justices, Justice Stevens sharply criticizes the
D.C. Circuit's characterization of a per se rule in antitrust law as "only a rule
of administrative convenience and efficiency, not a statutory command.,,37
Such a characterization, in Justice Stevens's view, vastly understates both
the authority and importance of per se rules. Not only do judicially
developed per se rules "have the same force and effect as any other statutory
commands,"38 but for reasons that transcend mere administrative
convenience, they preclude inquiry into the actual effects of a particular
instance of their violation. To Justice Stevens, the rationale of per se rules in
antitrust is prophylactic and similar to the rationale for what may equally
well be described as per se rules against exceeding speed limits. Although
the vast majority of drivers who exceed speed limits might do so safely, he
argues, we nevertheless outlaw driving at certain speeds because of the risks
entailed by the conduct. Likewise, certain business conduct, such as price
fixing, is prohibited by per se rules, without inquiry into actual effects or
even potential effects in the case at bar, because of the "threat to the free
market" posed by "every" instance of the conduct at issue.39 Because he
characterized the defendants' action in Superior Court Trial Lawyers as a
boycott in support of an attempt to fix prices, Justice Stevens treated the
action as a per se violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Hence, he
found it unnecessary to inquire into whether the defendants actually had the
market power necessary to achieve the ends they sought.4O
36. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411
(1990).
37. [d. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 856 F.2d 226, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
38. [d. at 433.
39. [d. at 434.
40. In articulating the rationale of per se rules in Superior Court Trial Lawyers,
Justice Stevens gives salience to a feature of per se rules that is often forgotten. The effect
of per se rules is to bring smaller economic actors within the sweep of the antitrust laws. If
the rule of reason is applied, smaller economic actors may be permitted to engage in
conduct that is prohibited to companies with market power. Hence, hostility to big business
may actually incline a judge away from per se rules and toward the rule of reason. It is only
the administrative convenience of per se rules that favors their existence as a weapon
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The two dissenting opinions in the Superior Court Trial Lawyers case
took positions sharply at odds with Justice Stevens's view of the matter.
Justice Brennan emphasized the need to remand the case to ascertain whether
the lawyers did possess the requisite market power.41 Justice Blackmun's
dissent provided a direct argument that because the defendant association's
members were officers of the court, the defendant lacked the market power
required to bring its action within the ambit of an antitrust violation.42
Because Justice Stevens maintained an attempt to fix prices as an essential
part of his characterization of what the lawyers association had done, he did
not come to grips with recent developments in the Court's antitrust
jurisprudence-namely, Northwest Wholesale Stationers43-that, arguably,
had made possession of market power (or control of an essential facility) a
prerequisite for application of the per se rule to concerted refusals to deal. In
Superior Court Trial Lawyers, Justice Stevens's veneration of the per se
rules of antitrust law reached an extreme when he analogized these rules to
bans on stunt flying and speeding that cannot be overcome by the expressive
content of banners or signs affixed to the relevant means of transportation.44
D. The Civil-Criminal Dichotomy
A third aspect of Justice Stevens's preference for unity in antitrust law is
reflected in his opinion in Gypsum.45 The Gypsum majority introduces a
sharp distinction between criminal and civil liability under section 1 of the
Sherman Act and requires independent proof of intent for conviction on the
basis of price fixing.46 Justice Stevens, concurring in all parts of the opinion
except the introduction of the dichotomy,47 acknowledges that he had long
against big business. When the focus is shifted away from administrative convenience, as it
is in Justice Stevens's Superior Court Trial Lawyers opinion, the impact of per se rules on
less traditional antitrust defendants is made more apparent.
41. Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 436 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
42. [d. at 453 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985).
44. Cf Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 437 (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (dismissing inference from permissibility of prohibitions on airplane
stunt flying to presumptive illegality of expressive boycotts as "non-sequitur").
45. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
46. [d. at 435.
47. [d. at 477 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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supported such a distinction in principle.48 Indeed, were he writing on a
clean slate, Justice Stevens would require a showing of specific intent, which
is considerably more stringent than the majority's test that the defendants
had knowledge of the market effects of their actions.49 He nevertheless
objects to the majority's precipitous departure from precedent,50 and he
expresses misgivings about the "mischief' that ..the new civil-criminal
dichotomy may work" in civil cases.51 Enforcement of the antitrust laws
relies on "conclusive presumptions" embodied in per se rules, and one such
conclusive presumption is that those who engage in price fixing sufficiently
to affect the market intended to do so.52 Justice Stevens is apprehensive that
the refusal to apply these conclusive presumptions in criminal cases might
undermine their use in civil actions. A cost of introducing bifurcated
standards, he suggests, is the risk that one standard will serve as a rationale
for undesirable alterations in the other standard. Concern about this risk is
doubtless one of the factors motivating Justice Stevens's quest for unity in
the definition of the price-fixing offense.
ill. THE BROAD SWEEP OF ANTITRUST LAW
Justice Stevens's commitment to the central goal of antitrust law, the
promotion and preservation of a competitive economy, is very strong. His
opinions reflect a concern with reaching the broadest range of activity that is
harmful to competition, whether it be undertaken by private individuals or
firms or by entities supervised by federal or state governments. As his
dissenting opinion in the Omni case53 shows, he is very critical of decisions
taken by his colleagues on the Court that would narrow the domain of
application of antitrust law. Justice Stevens's tendency is to limit
exemptions to the antitrust laws, particularly those rooted in the Parker
doctrine.54
Indeed, Justice Stevens's first antitrust opinion as a member of the
Court, Cantor v. Detroit Edison,55 was one in which he wrote for the
48. Id. at 474-75.
49. Id. at 474.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 475.
52. Id.
53. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 385 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (holding that state actions intended to
restrict competition are inunune from Sherman Act scrutiny).
55. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
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majority finding no exemption for actions taken in an unregulated market by
a private firm subject to regulation by a state public utility commission. The
defendant utility company had supplied free lightbulbs to its customers, a
policy for which state law obligated it to obtain the approval of state
regulators. To terminate the policy, moreover, would likewise require the
commission's approval. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens wrote for the Court,
..the option to have, or not to have, such a program is primarily
[defendant's]."56 Hence it was both fair and consistent with congressional
intent to subject the defendant's actions in the unregulated lightbulb market
to the strictures of the antitrust laws.
Similarly, but with regard to a different set of actors, Justice Stevens
concurred in the Boulder decision.57 There the Court held that home rule
statutes did not confer upon municipalities a broad exemption from the
antitrust laws.58 Those statutes simply did not provide the requisite explicit
statement of the state's intention to displace competition in a particular
" sphere of economic activity.59
Two of Justice Stevens's dissenting opinions serve to reinforce the
conclusion that he takes a broad view of the activity to which the antitrust
laws apply. First, in Hoover v. Ronwin,OO even though he thought the
plaintiff's claim was weak on the merits,6l he was unprepared to extend a
Parker-based exemption from section 1 of the Sherman Act to a committee
of private citizens determining the passing mark on the state bar
examination.62 He made it clear that had the Arizona Supreme Court been
setting the cutoff score on the test, the exemption would have applied.63 But
without explicit direction from that court to the state bar committee about
how to make the determination, the group of lawyers deciding the passing
grade was subject to a claim by a candidate who had failed the test and who
argued that the committee was acting in restraint of trade.64
56. Id. at 594.
57. Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, Colo., 455 U.S. 40
(1982).
58. Id. at 48-57.
59. Id. at 51.
00. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
61. Id. at 587-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reasoning that plaintiff's case invited
dismissal because of "low probability that [plaintiff would] prevail at trial," but that to
justify dismissal, majority "substantially broadens the doctrine of antitrust immunity. using
an elephant gun to kill a flea.").
62. Id. at 590-91.
63. Id. at 588.
64. Id. at 588-89.
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Second, in Southern Motor Carriers,65 the majority held that under
Parker the activities of rate bureaus operating within particular states were
immune from antitrust enforcement even though those activities were only
permitted and not compelled.66 Justice Stevens dissented-he would have
rejected the claim of exemption, which was based on state action, because
the activities were not compelled.67 He would have denied the exemption
even though he recognized, but dismissed as implausible, the majority's
argument that compelling price fixing among the trucking firms could lead
to an outcome that would depart even further from that yielded by unfettered
competition.68
To be sure, Justice Stevens does not take an absolute stand against
exemptions from the antitrust laws. To do so would be inconsistent with the
deference he shows to the legislature.69 Instead, his position is that if there
are to be such exemptions, either they should be explicitly granted by
Congress or-if they are grounded in the state action doctrine, as applied in
antitrust law-they should be based on an explicit intention by a state
legislature to displace competition in a particular area.70 Furthennore, when
private parties invoke a Parker-based exemption, the exempt behavior must
be subject to adequate state supervision.71
In one case Justice Stevens's respect for judicial precedent and deference
to the legislature caused him to grant an antitrust immunity about the merits
of which he was dubious. Specifically, in Square D,n he wrote for the Court
and held that under the precedent of Keogh,73 a set of carriers could not be
sued for treble damages by a private plaintiff when the claim attacked a rate
that had been filed with and approved by the Interstate Commerce
Commission.74 Justice Stevens was moved to this conclusion based on a
rather aged precedent because he observed that Congress was well aware of
65. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48
(1985).
66. ld. at 61-62.
67. ld. at 66, 74-75.
68. ld. at 78.
69. See William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The
Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1140-45 (discussing Justice Stevens's
deference to legislature).
70. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 80. Cf. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558,
594 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 71.
72. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986).
73. Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
74. Square D Co., 476 U.S. at 417.
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the Keogh holding and had had multiple adequate opportunities, when
considering legislation about permissible joint activities of transportation
carriers, to pass a statute that overruled that holding.?5
Justice Stevens's concern that economic activity not escape the watchful
eye of antitrust enforcement, whether by the government or by private
attorneys general, is also apparent in his dissenting opinion in the
Copperweld case.?6 In that case the majority held that cooperation between a
parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary cannot constitute a ··conspiracy" to
which section 1 of the Sherman Act might apply; the relation between parent
and wholly-owned subsidiary does not satisfy section 1's plurality
requirement.?7 Justice Stevens believed that the majority misread the
relevant precedent in reaching this conclusion,78 but his principal concern
seemed to be an instrumental one. The majority's position, he asserted,
would allow some significantly anticompetitive actions to be pursued with
impunity. Namely, a parent with market power sufficient to pursue
successful anticompetitive actions in league with its subsidiary- for
example, eliminating a competitor, as Justice Stevens believed Copperweld
had done-but without enough power to cross the monopoly-power
threshold and thereby render itself subject to a section 2 claim, might escape
liability.79
Justice Stevens surely perceived as clearly as his colleagues did that
whatever the Regal firm could have done as a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Copperweld, it could have done in its previous incarnation as an
unincorporated division of Lear Siegler. Moreover, it is difficult to believe
that he did not recognize that an alternative approach to ensuring that such
75. Id. at 419. Justice Stevens's commitment to judicial restraint is also evident in his
Professional Real Estate Investors concurrence. There he chides the majority on the ground
that "the Court should avoid an unnecessarily broad holding that it might regret when
confronted with a more complicated case." Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1920, 1932 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring); see
also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,9 (1984) ("It is far too late in
the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying
arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are
unreasonable 'per se' ."); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 474
(1978) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing departure from
precedent and insisting that "[n]o matter how wise the new rule that the Court adopts today
may be, I believe it is an amendment only Congress may enact").
76. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
77. Id.at771.
78. Id. at 783 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he rule announced today is inconsistent
with what this Court has held on at least seven previous occasions.").
79. Id. at 790-91.
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actions did not escape liability would have been to modify the criterion for
monopoly power, which is, after all, jUdicially constructed. The best
explanation for the position he took is that he was very concerned about the
frequency with which such potentially anticompetitive actions might occur
and not sanguine about the possibility of moving his colleagues on the Court
to modify the threshold for monopoly power, the first prong under the
canonical Grinnell test for the monopolization offense.80
An application of the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine81 provides yet another instance in which Justice Stevens would
have allowed the antitrust laws to sweep more broadly than his colleagues on
the Court would have permitted. In Professional Real Estate Investors,82
Columbia Pictures had brought copyright infringement claims against a
group of hoteliers who had displayed Columbia films to hotel guests. The
copyright defendants counter-claimed on antitrust grounds, alleging that the
copyright lawsuit was part of a strategy to establish a monopoly. After the
copyright claims had been dismissed, Columbia sought dismissal of the
antitrust counter-claims on the basis of Noerr.83 The majority would have
denied the defendants the cloak of Noerr-Pennington immunity only if a
reasonable litigant in their position would not have believed that it had a
genuine probability of succeeding on the merits.84 Concurring in the
judgment, Justice Stevens objected to the majority's view that a lawsuit
brought with a reasonable expectation of success in establishing liability
could not be an "objectively baseless" lawsuit that might be prohibited by
the Sherman Act.85 In Justice Stevens's view, a lawsuit in which success on
the merits could be reasonably expected might nevertheless be "objectively
unreasonable;" for instance, because of the expense of bringing the
80. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) ("The offense of
monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.").
81. See United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965);
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)
(holding that concerted efforts to influence public officials, even if intended to eliminate
competition, are not subject to antitrust scrutiny, unless petition to public officials is mere
sham to cover attempt to interfere directly with a competitor's business relationships).
82. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 1920 (1993).
83. ld. at 1924.
84. ld. at 1928.
85. ld. at 1932 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
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lawsuit.86 In short, Justice Stevens would subject the merits of the litigant's
case to a much more stringent cost-benefit test before he would allow the
party to benefit from the antitrust immunity afforded by the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine as applied in the context of litigation.87 .
Despite Justice Stevens's concern that the antitrust laws apply as broadly
as possible across the economic landscape, he has occasionally taken a
narrow view of the capacity of parties to sue under those laws. To be sure,
he writes favorably about the role of private (and state) attorneys general in
enforcing the antitrust laws. His opinion for the Court in California v.
American Stores CO.,88 which held that divestiture was a remedy that a
private plaintiff could seek in a section 7 case, lauded the role of litigants
other than the federal antitrust enforcement authorities in pursuing actions to
maintain the competitive character of the marketplace.89
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens advocated relatively narrow standing
doctrines in both McCready90 and Associated General Contractors .91 In
McCready, the majority held that a consumer of the services of a
psychologist could bring an antitrust action against an insurance company
that would not reimburse the costs of those services unless the bill had been
submitted by a psychiatrist.92 But Justice Stevens would have denied that
such a consumer had suffered an injury that gave her standing to sue under
section 4 of the Clayton Act.93 Assuming that the policy restricting
reimbursement for psychologists' services was adopted pursuant to an
agreement between psychiatrists and Blue Cross that violated the Sherman
Act, the plaintiff lacked standing, in Justice Stevens's view, because she had
sustained no "economic injury cognizable under the antitrust laws.'>94·
86. Id.
87. See also Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (1982)
(Posner, J.), quoted in Professional Real Estate Investors, 113 S. Ct. at 1935-36.
88. 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
89. Id. at 284 ("Private enforcement of the [Clayton] Act was in no sense an
afterthought; it was an integral part of the congressional plan for protecting competition.");
see also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. U.S.A. Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 352-53 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (defending antitrust standing for competitor harmed by vertical
conspiracy); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 129 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Effective enforcement of the antitrust laws has always depended largely on
the work of private attorney generals ....").
90. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
91. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
92. McCready, 475 U.S. at 484-85.
93. Id. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 493-94.
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Similarly, in Associated General Contractors, he wrote for the Court to deny
standing to a union that alleged that an association of contractors was
undertaking actions that would deny business to other contractors,
subcontractors, or customers who would deal with the plaintiff union.95
In both McCready and Associated General Contractors, Justice
Stevens's common-law notions of causal linkages appear to have overcome
his concern for the broadest scope of enforcement of the antitrust laws.96
More importantly, though, he displays a readiness to restrict the class of
permissible plaintiffs so long as there is an alternative plaintiff who might
challenge the conduct at issue. "The existence of an identifiable class of
persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the
public interest in antitrust enforcement diminishes the justification for
allowing a more remote party ... to perform the office of a private attorney
general.'>97 Denying standing to an antitrust plaintiff is permissible only
when, as in both McCready and Associated General Contractors, such a
denial "is not likely to leave a significant antitrust violation undetected or
unremedied.'>98 Hence, Justice Stevens's relatively restrictive standing
doctrine does not restrict the scope of conduct that should be subject to
antitrust scrutiny.
Moreover, there are other instances involving jurisdictional issues in
which Justice Stevens takes a much more expansive view of the applicability
of the antitrust laws. In Summit Health99 he wrote for the Court to weaken
the contact a plaintiff must demonstrate between a putative violation of the
antitrust laws and interstate commerce. As Justice Scalia argued forcefully in
dissent, the Summit Health Court essentially lets an action go forward if the
market in which the affected party participates has an impact on interstate
commerce.loo Prior to 1980, as Justice Scalia noted, the prerequisite for
bringing an antitrust action was that the specific conduct alleged in the
complaint affected interstate commerce. lOl With McLain v. Real Estate
Board of New Orleans lO2 came a weakening of the requirement to a
showing that the activity "infected" by the putative violation was sufficiently
95. Associated Gen. Contractors, 495 U.S. at 545-46.
96. [d. at 535-46 (comparing the common-law concept of proximate cause with the
issue of antitrust standing).
97. [d. at 542.
98. [d.
99. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
100. [d. at 336 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. [d. at 334.
102. McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
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tied to interstate commerce. The Summit Health decision made the required
connection to interstate commerce still weaker. Consequently, more
potentially anticompetitive behavior became subject to the antitrust laws.
IV. DEFERENCE TO THE TRIER OF FACT
A central characteristic of Justice Stevens's approach to antitrust cases is
the deference that he pays the trier of fact in the trial court.103 He relies
heavily on those findings and expresses dismay when, in his view, his
colleagues on the Court substitute their own judgments about the facts for
those of the finder of fact in the lower court, whether the case was tried to a
judge or to a jury. In his dissent in Brook Group,104 for example, where he
believed that predatory behavior by a group of cigarette manufacturers was
more plausible than the majority found it to be, his analysis of the behavior
of market participants relied critically on the trial record and the jury's
findings based on that record.105 As another example, in BMI Justice
Stevens dissented from the opinion of the Court, not because he disagreed
with its conclusion that the case called for a rule-of-reason analysis, but
because he believed that the record of the District Court and the findings of
the judge provided an adequate basis for carrying out the requisite
analysis.106 There was, to his mind, no need to remand the case for further
consideration by the Circuit Court of Appeals, especially since the decision
he favored would have upheld, though modified, the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.107
Justice Stevens's opinions express his deep confidence in the judicial
system and, in particular, in the ability of juries to make appropriate findings
103. Cf. Popkin, supra note 69 at 1100 (citing declarations by Justice Stevens in
non-antitrust cases of deference to trier of fact).
104. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578
(1993).
105. Id. at 2604 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("After 115 days of trial, during which it
considered 2,884 exhibits, 85 deposition excerpts, and testimony from 23 live witnesses, the
jury deliberated for nine days and then returned a verdict finding that [defendant] engaged
in price discrimination with a 'reasonable possibility of injuring competition.' The Court's
contrary conclusion rests on a hodgepodge of legal, factual, and economic propositions that
are insufficient, alone or together, to overcome the jury's assessment of the evidence.").
106. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. I, 26
(1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The record before this Court is a full one, reflecting
extensive discovery and eight weeks of trial. The District Court's findings of fact are
thorough and well-supported.").
107. Id. at 25-26.
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of fact. In several of his dissenting opinions, he explicitly criticizes what he
perceives to be his colleagues' lack of confidence in the judicial process. He
finds the majority in each such case fashioning a legal rule that is overly
broad because the majority fears the inability of juries to make distinctions
that Justice Stevens believes they are fully capable of making. For example,
in Omni,108 he argues that juries can distinguish independent municipal
action from action that results from an anticompetitive agreement between
municipal officials and private agents, and indeed he argues that the jury did
just that when the case was tried. He criticizes the majority for broadening
the immunity of municipalities simply because it doubts the ability of juries
to make such distinctions.l09
Similarly, in Business ElectronicsllO he argues that juries can
discriminate between dealer terminations that are rooted in anticompetitive
agreements and those that have a legitimate competitive basis. The majority
opinion had expressly relied on the difficulty a manufacturer would have "to
convince a jury that its motivation" in terminating a dealer was to ensure
adequate services rather than to maintain a minimum price.ll1 In his dissent,
Justice Stevens argues that the majority's insistence that for such a
termination to be per se illegal it must be accompanied by an explicit
agreement as to price between the surviving dealer and the manufacturer is
an unnecessary prophylactic requirement to ensure that juries do not go
astray.112 Justice Stevens believes that juries will be able to distinguish
pretextual explanations of actions that eliminate price competition from
legitimate justifications, which might be grounded, for example, in attempts
to stimulate provision of dealer services. In his view, the majority formulates
its explicit-price-term rule because it worries, mistakenly, about future
juries' capacities to discern such differences.113
As a final example, in Hoover v. Ronwin114 Justice Stevens remarks on
the irony that a group of lawyers is unwilling to place faith in the legal
108. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
109. [d. at 387 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The holding evidences an unfortunate lack
of confidence in our judicial system ...."); id. at 395 ("Judges who are closer to the trial
process than we are do not share the Court's fear that juries are not capable of recognizing
the difference between independent municipal action and action taken for the sole purpose
of carrying out an anticompetitive agreement for the private party.").
110. Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
111. [d. at 727-28.
112. [d. at 751-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. [d. at 752 ("[T]he majority exhibits little confidence in the judicial process as a
means of ascertaining the truth.").
114. 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
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system to determine whether or not the group acted in an anticompetitive
way. He chides the majority for having cloaked the committee setting the
passing grade for admission to the bar with Parker-based immunity because
the Court was concerned that without such protection, lawyers would worry
about how well antitrust claims against them would be decided and would
shrink from participating on such public service committees.115 At a
minimum, Justice Stevens believes that although the plaintiff's claim might
have lacked merit, it should have survived the motion to dismiss that the
District Court judge had granted on antitrust immunity grounds. It was
totally inappropriate, in his view, to stretch the reach of an immunity
doctrine simply to avoid having to have the judicial system adjudicate what
was most likely a frivolous claim.116
V. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE FACTS
Justice Stevens's deference to the factfinding of those closer to the
trial-the jury and the trial judge-reflects not only his view of the
appropriate institutional roles of the various participants in the judicial
process but also the importance he attaches to the facts themselves. The facts
are central to his common-law approach to the antitrust laws.117 Each of
Justice Stevens's opinions provides a careful statement of the facts, and he
frequently begins a dissenting opinion with his own restatement of the facts
of the case.118 He emphasizes that it is important to understand exactly what
the market participants involved in the case did,119 and his dissent often
relies heavily on his recasting of the facts. "Speculation about hypothetical
cases," the Justice has written in another context, "illuminates the discussion
115. Id. at 598 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 601.
117. Cf. Popkin, supra note 69. at 1105-10 (discussing Justice Stevens's focus on
facts in constitutional and other adjUdication).
118. See, e.g., Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2578, 2599-2602 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 586
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc.,441 U.S. 1,26-28 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. In Fortner II, for example, Justice Stevens emphasizes that the defendants'
offer of unique credit terms does not establish market power. Instead, the Court must
inquire whether the company offering the terms had particular cost advantages or whether
others also could offer the unique financing if they chose to do so. United States Steel Corp.
v. Fortner Enter., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 619-22 (1977).
HeinOnline -- 27 Rutgers L.J. 658 1995-1996
658 RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27:3
in a classroom, but it is evidence and historical fact that provide the most
illumination in a courtroom."120
Although Justice Stevens places the facts of the case at the center of each
antitrust dispute, his conceptualization and characterization of the facts is not
always complex or highly textured. For example, the principal issue in
Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association, Inc. v. Abbott
Laboratories121 was whether sales of pharmaceutical products to state and
local government hospitals for resale were subject to the Robinson-Patman
Act. In a 5-4 decision, a majority of the Court found that these sales were
not exempt from claims of price discrimination brought under the Act.122
Justice Stevens joined a dissenting opinion by Justice O'Connor, but he also
wrote separately to explain his argument that the pharmacies of state and
local government hospitals did not come within the terms of the Act because
these governmentally owned pharmacies were simply not in competition
with the privately owned pharmacies.123 For him, neither sales nor
purchases by governmental agencies-whether at the local, state, or federal
level-constituted the competition with private persons to which the statute
applied.
To support his position, Justice Stevens described the understandings
about the Robinson-Patman Act's zone of application that were presented at
various Congressional hearings on the statute, indeed the same hearings
upon which the majority relied for its argument to the contrary)24 But he
did not undertake a careful analysis of the market structure or of the question
whether the pharmacies that were part of governmentally owned hospitals
had any significant market power, which might affect the ability of other
pharmacies to sell their products and services. Justice Stevens did not
examine the behavior of sellers or customers in the market nor did he
explore how pharmacies competed with one another in this market. Instead,
he described the market and applied general arguments about the way in
which governmentally owned establishments do not compete with private
finns in the same line of business.125
As another example, despite his very careful description of many of the
facts in the Maricopa case, Justice Stevens does not proceed to analyze in
120. Brown-Fonnan Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573,
586 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
121. 460 U.S. 150 (1983).
122. [d. at 171.
123. [d. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. [d. at 172-73.
125. [d. at 173 -74.
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depth the data he provides about market structure and behavior.l26 He does
not explore whether an association of the size of the Maricopa Medical
Society could effectively set price given the terms of the agreement among
its members. Justice Stevens does not ask why the insurance companies
agreed to the conditions that the Society proposed or whether the Society
had market power in any meaningful sense. When he comes to discuss the
doctors' arguments in support of their maximum price-fixing agreement,
does he provide an adequate examination of their case that the agreement
was efficiency-enhancing and would benefit consumers?
To be sure, the lack of deep analysis of these matters can be explained
and justified on the ground that in Maricopa Justice Stevens was applying
the per se rule against maximum price fixing.l 27 But, as noted earlier,
though he characterized his decision in that case as an application of the per
se rule, the scope of his analysis belies his characterization. Hence, we are
justified in looking for the more complete analysis I suggest he might have
undertaken. And, in any event, even when Justice Stevens states that he is
undertaking a rule-of-reason analysis in BMI,128 he does not provide a
complete analysis of the relevant market. In this case he does consider the
market power of BMI and ASCAP, but principally by critiquing a weak
argument made by the defendants that was founded on the countervailing
power of the plaintiff, CBS.l29 Justice Stevens, however, does not give us a
very deep analysis of the efficiency-enhancing properties offered in defense
of the blanket-licensing arrangement that was under attack.
Two other examples of cases in which Justice Stevens provides a thick
factual description but a less than complete market analysis are Jefferson
Parish130 and Aspen.131 In the former, he goes into great detail about the
agreement between the hospital and the Roux anesthesiology group, the
history of the hospital, and the area in which the hospital is located.132 But
when it comes to the analysis, Justice Stevens spends much more time on
the issue of whether anesthesiology and surgery are one service or two133
than he does on the character of competition among hospitals and
126. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y., 457 U.S. 332, 336-42 (1982).
127. [d. at 354-55.
128. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979).
129. [d. at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
131. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
132. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 5-7.
133. [d. at 18-24.
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physicians. Admittedly, he was in this instance constrained by a rather thin
trial record on the issue of market definition and market structure. l34 But he
dismisses too quickly the kinds of market characteristics-the effect of
insurance and imperfect information on consumers' insensitivity to price and
their sensitivity to hospital location and the like-that the Court of Appeals
believed were relevant.135
In Aspen Justice Stevens provides a detailed history of the development
of the several ski sites and the cooperative and competitive relations among
them.136 Indeed, the history of their cooperation in offering a multi-
mountain pass is essential to his argument about why the behavior of Aspen
Skiing Company ("Ski Company") satisfied the test for monopolization.
Moreover, since the market-definition issue was not before the Court, he
cannot be faulted for his description of the relevant market as downhill
skiing at Aspen, Colorado,137 problematic as that characterization is.
Instead, the shortcoming of his analysis was his not examining the rich set of
facts from a multiplicity of perspectives. For example, the dispute between
Ski Company and Highlands could have been viewed as a dispute between
two parties over the division of rents deriving from the particularly favorable
location of the mountains in Aspen. From this perspective, the dispute may
have carried minimal implications for efficiency. Or, as some have argued,
the original multi-mountain pass arrangement may have been one in which
Highlands was successfully free-riding on the attractiveness of Ski
Company's slopes and getting a disproportionate share of the rents.138 Given
the lack of business justification offered by Ski Company for its cessation of
the multi-mountain pass with Highlands, consideration of these alternative
perspectives might not have affected the outcome in the case. But a more
complete analysis of the vast array of factual material would have been
desirable and, at a minimum, would have strengthened the support for the
decision.
In sharp contrast with Justice Stevens's limited deployment of the facts
in these several cases stands the broad and deep analysis that he undertook in
the Brook Group case.l39 In his dissent he argued that oligopolistic
predatory pricing of the type alleged was plausible in the cigarette
134. [d. at 28-30.
135. [d. at 27-29.
136. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 587-95.
137. [d. at 595-96.
138. HoVENKAMP, supra note 33, § 7.5, at 265.
139. Brook Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993).
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industry.140 He relied heavily on the factual record developed at trial,
respected the factfinding ability of the jury, and carefully considered
alternative constructions and interpretations of the factual base.
VI. CONCLUSION
The antitrust jurisprudence of Justice Stevens, as manifested through his
opinions during his first twenty years on the Supreme Court, is the
handiwork of a devotee and craftsman of antitrust law. It provides evidence
of just how difficult it is to bring unity and coherence to this important body
of law, especially given the constraints of the judicial role that Justice
Stevens perceives.
The principal antitrust statute is vague and open-ended, even though
later, elaborating legislation has been more explicit in its commands. There
is a widespread consensus about the principal goal of antitrust law, but other
competing objectives also find support in both the legislative history and the
judicial development over time. The latter, historical judicial elaboration has
produced a set of categorical boxes that mayor may not be helpful but with
which a judge deciding cases today must work. The institutionally defined
responsibilities and roles of other decisionmakers-Congress, the states,
lower court judges, and juries-must be recognized and respected. And, in
every case, the individualized set of facts is crucially important. Before
rendering a decision, the antitrust judge must be sure that the facts of the
case are well articulated and that the multiple stories they can be used to tell
are well considered.
140. [d. at 2604-<>6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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